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T

he 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States and the 2006 expanded version describe the broad strategic goals that have become
known as the Bush Doctrine: military primacy, global transformation, preemption, and a willingness to act unilaterally. Europeans, like American critics of the Bush Doctrine, worry about the unfortunate juxtaposition of the
unachievable goal of completely ending tyranny throughout the world, the
confusion between preemptive war and preventive war, the use of 9/11 as a
pretext for unilateralism, and the document’s preface declaring, “This is a
wartime national security strategy . . . .” From the perspective of most Europeans, these overly broad goals are in sharp contrast with the European
preference for multilateralism and consensus. These elements of the Bush
Doctrine, and their applications in Iraq, have radically altered the extensive
post-9/11 sympathy and support for the American response to the threat of
terrorism.
The focus of this article is on the transatlantic divide over preemption, and it is therefore important to distinguish between the two chapters of
the National Security Strategy (NSS) where preemption is discussed. In both
the 2002 and the 2006 versions the first reference is in Chapter III, titled,
“Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us (sic) and Our Friends.” Both versions of Chapter III focus
on global terrorism and terrorists as non-state actors. The 2002 version states:
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[W]e will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of
self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them
from doing harm against our people and our country. . . .1

The 2006 document is expanded in its detail related to the nature and
causes of terrorism, and lays out a more developed concept for denying terrorists access to allies, territory, and weapons of mass destruction. The overarching element of the strategy is to:
Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur. A government has no
higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. The
hard core of the terrorists cannot be deterred or reformed; they must be tracked
down, killed, or captured.2

The explicit use of preemption is avoided, but the meaning is precisely the same. The softening of language from “preemption” to “prevention” is one of those puzzling and Talmudic aspects of the inter-agency
process that produces these documents. It may seem a minor point, but the
question remains, why soften language in the chapter discussing the relatively non-controversial strategy of preempting terrorist groups before they
attack while retaining the more explicit language in Chapter V where the preemption against nation-state actors is spelled out in detail?
Chapter III of the 2006 NSS states that the United States and its allies
“make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who
support and harbor them . . . .” However, in cases of support or harboring, the
proposed and somewhat vague objective is to deny rogue states their ability to
support terrorism. The criticism in the United States and from our European allies comes in response to Chapter V of both the 2002 and 2006 versions where
preemption against nation-states is spelled out in unambiguous detail. After asserting a stated preference for multilateral diplomacy the 2006 version states:
If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self-defense, we do
not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as
to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. When the consequences of an attack
with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as
grave dangers materialize. This is the logic of preemption.3

Dr. Gary Guertner served as the Dean of Academics at the George Marshall Center
for European Security Studies from 1998-2004. He was Chairman of the Department of
National Security Strategy at the Army War College from 1992-1998, and Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute from 1988-1991. He is adjunct Professor of National Security Policy at the University of Arizona.
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The logic of preemption is clear even though the term is confused
with the more accurate legal formulation, preventive war. The concept of preemption or the anticipatory use of force in the face of imminent attack has
been broadened in the NSS to encompass preventive war and use of force
when no evidence of imminent attack is present, but serious threats to US
security may gather and grow over time. This unilateral declaration of when
to use military force against another state is the point where most Europeans
and many Americans diverge from the Bush Doctrine’s explicit rejection of
deterrence.

The Response of “Old” Europe
European responses to the Bush Doctrine and its application in Iraq
are stark landmarks in the deterioration of transatlantic relationships because
they are in such sharp contrast to the political and emotional bonds that followed 9/11. The French headline that declared, “Today we are all Americans,” captured the feelings of virtually all Europeans. The assistance clause
of NATO’s Article V was invoked for the first time in history, and Europeans
joined Americans in the continental defense of the United States. The war
against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan was broadly endorsed as legal and reasonable retaliatory responses.
The publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy precipitated a
healthy debate among Americans and Europeans that might have ended in a
strong consensus on the appropriate use of force against terrorist organizations
and their sponsors. The extension of preemption to embrace preventive war as
described in Chapter V of the NSS and its application to regime change in Iraq,
however, derailed a critical debate on how to formalize broad alliance policies
against terrorism and created instead bitter divisions between the FrancoGerman position and the Bush Administration. The apogee of American
self-assurance and European opposition came in a speech by then Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the annual Wehrkunde security conference in
Munich on the eve of war. Secretary Rumsfeld asserted in remarks aimed primarily at then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer that the occasion for
argument was over. “It is difficult to believe there still could be questions in the
minds of reasonable people open to the facts before them.”4
The invasion of Iraq not only obscured more reasoned discussions
taking place within NATO and in key European capitals from which the greatest opposition to the war was centered, but also the consensus that was emerging on how to fight the Global War on Terrorism. At the NATO summit in
Prague in November 2002, NATO adopted Military Committee (MC) 472,
“NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism,” a document that
implicitly supports the option of preemptive strikes against terrorist threats:
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NATO’s actions should . . . work on the assumption that it is preferable to deter
terrorist attacks or to prevent their occurrence rather than deal with their consequences . . . . Counter terrorism is offensive military action designed to reduce
terrorists’ capabilities. Allied nations agree that terrorists should not be allowed to base, train, plan, stage and execute terrorist actions and that the threat
may be severe enough to justify acting against these terrorists and those who
harbor them, as and where required . . . .5

The explicit language of preemption and anticipatory self-defense
was not included at the insistence of Germany and France, and a more extensive discussion and consensus were cut short by European opposition to the
manner in which these concepts were being applied to regime change in Iraq.6
MC 472, however, represented a transatlantic consensus on meeting the terrorist threat, but was lost in the acrimony between “old Europe” and the
American push for war.
The European Union too has, in its declaratory policies, attempted to
address wider strategic issues in the post-9/11 world. Many of these are mutually supportive of the NSS preemptive strategies against terrorism and WMD
proliferation. The EU has established a common definition of terrorism and a
list of terrorist groups, enhanced its tools to disrupt terrorist financing, and
approved new measures to strengthen border controls. 7
While Secretary General Javier Solana has been explicit that the EU
would not undertake US-style preemptive military actions, he has espoused
“preemptive engagement,” attacking root causes before they become acute
international crises. This approach reflects Europe’s strategic personality as
developed in more detail in the EU strategy document, “A Secure Europe in a
Better World.” Here, Secretary General Solana sounds a note quite compatible with transatlantic unity outlining EU goals to prevent, protect, pursue,
and respond to the international terrorist threat:
Our traditional concept of self-defense—up to and including the Cold War—
was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defense will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more
dangerous. State failure and organized crime spread if neglected. . . . This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention
and threat prevention cannot start too early. 8

Solana continues in a section of the document titled “Policy Implications for Europe:”
We need to be more active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to
the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention
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at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and
development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic
threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and
when necessary, robust intervention.9

Even though preventive engagement against root causes is the preferred strategy, the paragraphs cited could easily have been tucked into Chapter
III of the NSS. While most Europeans do not support the case for preemption as
applied against Iraq, there are scenarios that lend themselves to the application
of preemptive force against terrorist organizations and their sponsors. Future
reactions from Europeans are almost certain to be contextual in the sense that if
terrorist links are established and proven, Europeans would find it difficult to
disapprove. The question of consensus in the legitimacy of preemptive force
will be closely linked to its practicality, how it is executed, and how quickly it
might succeed. As Karl-Heinz Kamp has argued in one of the few European assessments moderately supportive of the Bush Doctrine:
Even if the debate usually concentrates itself around the question of a decisive
military strike against a state, the spectrum of possible options is nevertheless
substantially broad. Non-military as well as “semi-military” actions are just as
conceivable against governments and non-governmental actors. 10

Kamp goes on to elaborate specific preemptive options most likely to
be supported by Europeans. They cover a wide spectrum of actions using
nearly all instruments of power and including naval blockades, attacking data
networks, acts of sabotage against suspected WMD storage or production facilities, and direct attacks against command centers for terrorists or their state
sponsors. Each of the options described by Kamp has a different level of acceptability and effectiveness depending on the circumstances at the time.
Destruction of a terrorist training camp would be met with greater public approval, on both the national and international level, than the overthrow of a
government when preemption is associated specifically with regime change.
For most Europeans, the dimensions of preemptive military action must still be
measured in some fashion against the degree of threat and the actions may only
include those that are required for the sustained removal of the threat. All of
this reflects the kind of consensus building debate that should dominate and
strengthen the transatlantic partnership’s war on terrorism. Instead, agreement
on many approaches are subordinated to criticism of the Administration’s disastrous Iraq policies based on assumptions that containment and deterrence
are no longer viable strategic options.
In addition to NATO and EU acceptance of preemption in extreme
situations, the concept is being debated and integrated in individual national
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strategies. France, for example, one of the leading opponents of US actions in
Iraq and the nation that led the opposition to preemption within the NATO
framework, has in its new Programmation Militaire, 2003-2008 the explicit
reference to “capacite d’anticipation” and the necessity of a preemptive strike
in certain situations:
We must . . . be prepared to identify and forestall threats as soon as possible. In
this context, the possibility of preemptive action might be considered, from the
time that an explicit and confirmed threatening situation is identified.11

Germany has avoided official policy debates on preemptive military
actions. A new Chancellor with a slim ruling coalition has focused on domestic priorities and cautious attempts to repair relations with Washington. A majority of Germans still link the Bush Doctrine with the war in Iraq and its
primary goal of regime change. However, the more its neighbors and allies
address the issues of preemption in the war on terrorism and as Germany becomes more directly a target of terrorism, the less able Germany will be in
avoiding the issue and finding more common ground with Washington. The
failed attempt to bomb the rail system in Griesbaum and Koblenz in July 2006
was a wake-up call for those 60 percent in Germany who do not feel personally threatened by international terrorism. 12
The recently declassified “Key Judgments” of the US National Intelligence Estimate, “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United
States,” dated April 2006, was also a wake-up call for Europeans. Paradoxically, it is likely to solidify transatlantic cooperation against terrorism, but
deter cooperation with Washington’s idealistic notions of regional and global
transformation, and military interventions in the Islamic world. The paragraph in the NIE painfully felt in Europe states:
The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004
Madrid and 2005 London bombings.13

Europeans have been fighting terrorism for decades, but the terrorist
groups were mostly Euro-specific, with the exception of groups like Hamas or
the Kurdish PKK who used Europe as a support base to attack outside the EU or
committed acts of violence against very precise targets. Recent attacks and the
resulting mass casualties have made it obvious that the contemporary Islamic
threat has evolved to targeting Europeans directly. There is little disagreement
that the worst of these attacks in Madrid and London were in direct response to
Spanish and British support for the war in Iraq. Terrorists in the Islamic diaspora can, on the one hand, punish Europeans for their support of US policies in
36
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the Islamic world, but in doing so, create even greater cooperation and collaboration in fighting the broader and more important global war on terrorism.

Preemption and the New Europe
The new members of NATO and the EU roughly coincide with former
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s rhetorical attempt to reject the FrancoGerman opposition to the war in Iraq and embrace the new, more “enlightened”
members of the European security community. If you look at the entire NATO
Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east and there are a lot of
new members.14
The partitioning of Europe on the basis of Iraq grossly misrepresented the number of “old European” states who supported the American Administration’s Iraq policies. Nevertheless, it is instructive and not surprising
why the newest democracies in Europe would not want to alienate Washington, their chief sponsor in the enlargement of the NATO alliance. Joining
NATO was the highest foreign policy priority among those seven states formally admitted to the ranks at the Prague summit in November 2002. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as NATO enlarged, embracing old
members of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union. These new members had no inclination to oppose Washington’s position in the first crisis
coming only four months after their formal invitation into Western cooperative security structures. Their political support was guaranteed from the beginning and played an important role in legitimizing the war. Their actual
military contributions, the political fallout at home, and their willingness to
support Washington in the future are different matters entirely.
No recent NATO invitee or prospective applicant was in a position to
oppose US policies given the nearly two-year membership ratification process before them, dependence on US diplomatic and military assistance, and
prospects for economic assistance and investment that NATO and EU memberships guaranteed. Early rumors that the United States was prepared to
move bases from Germany to the territory of new NATO members further galvanized the support of new members. These pragmatic considerations combined with a deep sense of strategic nostalgia among former Warsaw Pact
members who saw NATO membership and US support as vital to their
post-Cold War security and a stamp of Western political approval. 15
It is against this background of strategic necessity that the newly invited members to NATO and future aspirants quickly granted base rights,
overflight rights, and pledges to send military support contingents to Iraq.
The political significance for Washington in its battle for domestic support
far outweighed the military value of their contributions to the war and the doSummer 2007
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mestic political sacrifices made by each in supporting a war that was opposed
by majorities in every participant state. In the specific case of preemption as
defined in the Bush Doctrine, none were willing to embrace its legality under
international law as it applied to nation-states. 16
Paradoxically, the most militarily significant contributions to the
war came from the forces of “old Europe.” The United Kingdom, Italy, and
Spain combined to provide most of the 13,400 allied forces in Iraq by August
2003, and these forces were prepared to participate in combat operations. 17
Poland provided a force of 2,000 and led a multinational division. Other “new
European” contingents were small, numbering less than 500 and more often
less than 100, and none, including Poland, was authorized to participate in
combat operations. Several coalition partners felt they had been brought into
Iraq under false pretenses. Their commitment was to peacekeeping and stability operations that degenerated into combat because of Washington’s poor
planning for post-war Iraq and a fixation with the validation of transformation doctrine by forcing large cuts in Central Command’s war plans. According to Thomas Ricks in his account of allied contributions in Iraq:
“We came for Phase IV—security and stabilization operations,” said Lt. General Mieczyslaw Bieniek, the Polish paratrooper who commanded the multinational division operating in south-central Iraq. That was how the mission
statement was framed to him . . . . “All of a sudden, against our will, we find ourselves in a combat zone.” That caught him in a bind: His parliament had forbidden him to conduct offensive operations.18

The deteriorating conditions on the ground in Iraq and domestic politics at home precipitated a steady reduction in European forces, with many exits hastened by elections in which voters chose political leaders and parties that
promised to quit the coalition. The withdrawals were accompanied by deep resentment among new and aspirant members of NATO and the EU. The application of a doctrine based on and preemptive war had committed the prestige of
the West and the loyalty of European allies to a poorly planned war of choice.
American legitimacy has been damaged by its flawed judgment, specifically,
during the latter stages of the conflict and the results will make it more difficult
to build coalitions of the willing in the future. Afghanistan is the most recent
case in point where a large contingent of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, comprised primarily of United States, British, Canadian,
and German combat forces) battling a Taliban resurgence have failed in efforts
to get new and old members alike to send additional forces. Many of those who
do have troops on the ground dilute their effectiveness with caveats or restrictive rules of engagement on how they may be used. Only six nations place no
restrictions on the troops they contribute to NATO operations. Others are lim38
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ited by incompatibility of equipment and communications or domestic politics
shaped to a considerable degree by opposition to the war in Iraq and lessons
learned from their respective participation in the US-led coalition.19
The scope of cooperation between Washington and its European allies is diminishing, largely due to the war in Iraq. Little support can be expected for additional military actions against the “axis of evil.” Europeans,
with the exception of Prime Minister Tony Blair who echoes President Bush’s
philosophy, do not see Iraq as the central front in the war on terror. It is often
viewed as a tragic detour, but not one that has lessened European willingness
to cooperate across the board in the global war against terrorism and terrorist
organizations. Among the many tragedies associated with the war is the possibility of an unnecessary transatlantic rift that masks a powerful consensus
on the larger and more vital war against global terrorism.

A Gift to Moscow
Preemption quickly found its way into Russian declaratory policies
encompassing both domestic and international threats. President Vladimir
Putin declared that:
If the principle of preventive use of force is established in international practice, then Russia will have the right to act in a similar way to protect its national
interests.20

The Chechen terrorist attacks at the school in Beslan where 1,200
children and adults were held hostage and more than 300 perished brought a
forceful elaboration of these rights from the Russian Chief of the General
Staff. General Yuri Baluevsky declared the right to launch preemptive strikes
against terrorist bases worldwide. The choice “of strike methods will be determined by the specific situation in a particular region.” Only the use of nuclear weapons was ruled out.21
The Bush Doctrine has also underscored and perhaps legitimized a
more muscular Russian approach to the “near abroad” where the shadow of
Russian military power and economic interdependence still constrains the
policies of Georgia and Ukraine among others. In Georgia, Russia has invoked preemption to justify future intervention against Chechen separatists
operating from Georgian territory. In Chechnya, a protracted and violent civil
conflict continues, but with more muted Western criticism of human rights violations as the conflict blends increasingly into the broader war against terrorism and Islamic extremists.22 President Putin, with great diplomatic skills,
walks a fine line in pursuing his internal war against radical Islam and his external relations with the Muslim world. In a nation with 20 million Muslims
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he has carefully stated that terrorism has “no religion or nationality . . . only
provocateurs could seek to equate Muslims with terrorism . . . but there is a
problem and it is a global problem. Here, we can work as full strategic partners with the United States.”23 Embracing both preemption and the United
States as a strategic partner in the war on terror implies that Moscow is in
league with the United States and by association is a powerful country ready
to defend its vital interests with methods made legitimate by association.
Vice President Richard Cheney’s criticism of Russia in May 2006 and the
growing rift over sanctions against Iran may weaken Putin’s embrace of the
Bush Administration, but not Russian acceptance of preemption if and when
it fits Russia’s strategic interests.

Recommendations for the Next National Security Strategy
In Chapter III of the National Security Strategy preemption as applied
against the war on terrorism and the retaliatory war against the Taliban and al
Qaeda in Afghanistan are widely supported on both sides of the Atlantic.
Tragically, a united Western front against the global war on terrorism has been
obscured and disrupted by Chapter V of the NSS with preemption and the attempts at regime change and political transformation in Iraq and the broader
Middle East. No serious change in course can be expected for the remainder of
the current administration’s tenure despite the assaults on its policies at home
and abroad. The next administration, Democrat or Republican, will need to address three major issues in a new and revised national security strategy to effectively wage the war on terrorism with a united, transatlantic front.
First, Chapter V preemption against nation-states, no matter how they
may be regarded in their foreign and domestic policies, needs to be reexamined
through extensive debate among allies on the continued utility of containment
and deterrence of common threats as alternatives to preemptive wars. Iraq is a
classic case study in the success of containment that was virtually ignored as a
long-term alternative. Yet, both pre-war and post-war evidence is conclusive in
the debilitating effects a decade of sanctions had on the Iraqi economy, military
power, and most of all, its WMD programs and stockpiles.24 The US Joint Forces
Command has also identified Saddam Hussein’s motivation for his obstructive
behavior toward United Nations weapons inspectors. As it turned out a weakened dictator was playing a dangerous game. “Deterrence by ambiguity” was his
way of clinging to a deterrent posture aimed at Iran and the possibility of Shia insurgency against his regime.25 Western containment was working and was a
cost-effective, prudent alternative, in comparison to Iraq today.
The Administration’s assumption that deterrence is no longer an effective tool against radical regimes is an assertion that does not fit a future
40
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world in which even a small number of states withdraw from the existing
non-proliferation regime. According to the NSS:
In the Cold War . . . we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only on the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take
risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.26

Setting aside the fact that this does not accurately describe US Cold
War, nuclear posture based on preemptive, damage limiting, counter-force
nuclear war plans, it is informative to revisit the debate preceding Soviet and
Chinese entry into the nuclear club. Neither regime, it was argued, was sufficiently Western enough to value human life or to hesitate in sacrificing the
lives of millions to achieve political objectives. Ethnocentric assumptions
were wrong, rationality prevailed, and deterrence worked for over 50 years
between states with radically different normative values.
If preemption is applied against either Iranian or North Korean
nuclear capabilities those nations could counter with such a wide range of
assaults against US and allied interests that deterrence is by far the least desirable option. Preparing for a post-proliferation world and a second nuclear era
has the advantage of reinforcing deterrence, underscoring the credibility of the
American nuclear umbrella over its regional allies, and dissuading many
would-be proliferators. The implicit use of preemption and preventive war for
counterproliferation risks precipitating the very dangers our national security
strategy seeks to prevent.27
Fears of sharing WMD with terrorist organizations can be addressed
through direct communication and declaratory policies that clearly spell out
how transfers from nation-states to non-state actors would be considered an
act of war resulting in US and allied retaliation. Moreover, the threat of sharing WMD with terrorist organizations may be less than critics of deterrence
acknowledge since biological, chemical, and radiological weapons can easily
be produced in the absence of state sponsorship.28 This more serious threat
must be addressed by extensive US-European intelligence, law enforcement,
and military cooperation that reflects the growing consensus that preemption
against terrorists is not an issue dividing the United States and Europe.
Second, the United States needs to de-link the threats from al Qaeda
and the networks it has spawned from the maze of terrorists groups that were
operating for decades prior to 9/11. An essential first step is to distinguish
global threats to US security from longstanding regional and increasingly radicalized terrorism that is the product of the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Associating al Qaeda with every known terrorist organization regardless of the
nature of that support, whether declaratory or operational, only strengthens the
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image and political clout of al Qaeda in the Muslim world. Joining European
allies in a more balanced and evenhanded approach in the region would
contribute to a more positive image of the United States and weaken al Qaeda’s
influence. Saudi Arabia’s Prince Bandar Saud, longtime ambassador to the
United States, lectured President Bush on this problem prior to 9/11 when he
described the impact on the Muslim world of Israeli attacks using Americanmade weapons and the US pattern of condemning Palestinian violence but
rarely Israeli violence. “The United States,” he said, “has to find a way to
separate the actions of the Israeli government and its own interests in the
region.”29
Support for Israel is a fundamental and enduring part of US foreign
policy, but this does not assume support for all Israeli policies and actions. US
interests in a post-9/11 world require, as Prince Bandar stated, a perception in
the Muslim world that US and Israeli interests are not identical. Policy delineations can best be achieved through a robust reengagement of the peace process
that includes participation of the European Union with the dual objectives of
moderating the most radical Palestinian factions and outlining a path to the final contours of a Palestinian state. It is the process itself that is important and
the credibility of the Western commitment to a fair outcome that will, in the
short-term, contribute to moderating the anti-Western mood throughout the
Muslim world.
Third, none of the above can succeed without a united front between
the academic and policy communities on both sides of the Atlantic to discredit the neo-conservatives in and out of government whose prescriptions
and predictions have led to disaster in Iraq and undermined the war on terrorism. A clear intellectual audit trail of neo-conservative writings and policy
prescriptions led to all four major pillars of the Bush Doctrine and the NSS—
preemption, unilateralism, military primacy, and democratic transformation.
The godfather of the neo-conservative movement, Norman Podhoretz, claims
an additional pillar—the concept of how Israel and the Palestinians fit into the
larger war on Islamic terrorism. Podhoretz says, “Israel’s struggle is yet another front in the global struggle against terrorism, which is to say World War
IV.”30 The neo-conservative effort to link the longstanding crisis in the Middle East with the larger, post-9/11 war against al Qaeda detracts from the US
effort to focus on the primary threat. Linking the two creates more antiAmericanism in the Middle East and more al Qaeda sympathizers. The apparent neo-conservative agenda is to use the post-9/11 war on terrorism to
strengthen the US defensive umbrella over Israel at a time of increasing peril
from regional terrorism. This is a serious threat to any ally and needs to be addressed with robust US participation, but also as a uniquely regional crisis,
not as part of the global war on terrorism. Crisis linkage is self-defeating in a
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global struggle that will require discriminating approaches in the Islamic
world, approaches designed to limit hostility against unified Western efforts
and to contain the global threat.
Neo-conservative worldviews embedded in the current administration’s doctrine rebound in the Muslim world in ways that undermine the key
element in the war on terrorism. That is the erosion of moderate Muslim support due to their own unique perceptions, crisis linkages, and conspiracy theories. Our involvement in Iraq and one-sided support of Israel is radicalizing
mainstream Muslim opinion. Muslim intellectuals increasingly see the Bush
Doctrine as a modern-day crusade against Islam. In this view, democracy
masks an effort to colonize Muslim lands and control oil resources. When
moderate intellectuals can argue that Pope Benedict XVI’s controversial
speech at Regensburg University in which he criticized the Prophet Muhammad was a Western “fatwa” granting President Bush religious justification
for wars against Islam, then the West has a crisis of public diplomacy and
credibility that only reinforces the appeal of radical Islam. 31
Regaining the confidence of moderate Muslims is vital. Our European allies with experience in the region and an Islamic diaspora of some 23
million have a strategic approach that may bridge the gap between Europe,
the United States, and the Muslim world. First, Europeans believe the Bush
Doctrine’s combination of military power and democratic transformation
confuses power with counter-productive righteousness. The European approach emphasizes economic and political instruments of power to attack
root causes that lead to radicalization and recruitment. Root causes are a combination of poverty, autocratic governance, rapid modernization, corruption,
and the absence of political, economic, or educational opportunities. Attacking root causes is not only a foreign policy goal, but increasingly a domestic issue that will determine the long-term stability and integration of
Europe’s Muslim minorities.
Finally, before Western unity can be effectively mobilized against
threats from radical Islam, the next administration will need to bridge the
gap between European and American strategic culture. 32 To do this, the next
US National Security Strategy must have greater emphasis on political and
economic instruments of power and abandon the rhetoric of military primacy and preemption in pursuit of the unattainable goal of democratic
transformation.
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